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Abstract—Autonomous vehicles (AV) depend on the sensors
like RADAR and camera for the perception of the environment,
path planning, and control. With the increasing autonomy and
interactions with the complex environment, there have been
growing concerns regarding the safety and reliability of AVs.
This paper presents a Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)
based fault injection framework to assess the resilience of
an open-source driving agent, called openpilot, under different
environmental conditions and faults affecting sensor data. To
increase the coverage of unsafe scenarios during testing, we use
a strategic software fault-injection approach where the triggers
for injecting the faults are derived from the unsafe scenarios
identified during the high-level hazard analysis of the system.
The experimental results show that the proposed strategic fault
injection approach increases the hazard coverage compared to
random fault injection and, thus, can help with more effective
simulation of safety-critical faults and testing of AVs. In addition,
the paper provides insights on the performance of openpilot safety
mechanisms and its ability in timely detection and recovery from
faulty inputs.
Keywords—resilience, safety, STPA, fault injection, autonomous
vehicle, autonomous driving, self-driving, openpilot, ACC, LKAS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicles are one of the most complex
software-intensive cyber-physical systems (CPS). In addition
to the basic car mechanisms (e.g. gas/brake system, steering
system), they are equipped with driving assistance mechanisms
such as Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Lane Keeping Assist
System (LKAS), and Assisted Lane Change. AVs use smart
sensors (e.g. camera, RADAR, LIDAR) and machine learning
(ML) algorithms for perception of the surrounding environ-
ment, path finding, and navigation. For example, LKAS uses
computer vision and ML to process camera data, locate the
right/left lane markers, and adjust the steering angle to keep
the vehicle inside the lanes.
With increasing deployment of AVs on the road and the
goal of moving towards full autonomy in near future, reliability
and safety of these systems are of high concern. There have
been already several reports on incidents involving AVs, e.g.,
the fatal crashes of Tesla model S in 2016 [1], model X in
2018 [2], and Uber accident in 2018 [3]. The safe operation
of an AV depends not only on the proper functioning of
the sensors, actuators, and mechanical components, but also
the proper operation of the autonomous control software and
its interactions with other components, human driver, and
environment. The faults in the controller may become activated
either by the environmental conditions or human errors, and
get propagated into the system resulting in safety hazards.
Current practice in testing and safety validation of AVs
involves simulation testing using realistic scenarios in virtual
environments or real-world road testing. However, given the
high costs of developing testbeds and running experiments,
a question that arises is what constitutes an adequate testing
experiment or how much testing is good enough? The safety-
critical faults causing hazards and incidents are rare and it
might take forever for an AV to experience them during road
test experiments. To ensure resilience against safety-critical
faults, we need techniques for specifically testing the influence
of such faults using fault injection.
Most of the previous works in this area focus on analysis of
adversarial attacks on ML systems and assessment of resilience
of ML algorithms used for computer vision. Evtimov et al.
[4] proposed Robust Physical Perturbations (RP2), a robust
attack algorithm that generates physically realizable adversarial
perturbations of the road signs by using perturbation masks in
the shape of graffiti. DeepXplore [5] and DeepTest [6] focused
on maximizing neuron coverage to generate perturbed images
to test deep learning based algorithms. Others have studied
attacks to the AV’s radar module, such as creating a ghost
vehicle or radar jamming [7]. However, an open question is
whether the propagation of such faults into the control software
could actually lead to unsafe scenarios and incidents.
This paper studies the resilience of an open-source driving
agent, called openpilot [8], which has been used in some car
models on real roads, against faults and environmental con-
ditions affecting the sensor data, including RADAR, camera,
and car sensors for steering angle and speed. We specifically
focus on these faults as they directly affect the performance of
ML and perception systems, which are reported to be a major
cause (∼44%) of disengagement incidents in AVs [9]. We
have created a simulation environment consisting of openpilot
control software integrated with a computer vision module
for real-time processing of the previously collected video
data captured from the roads and a fault injection framework
that mimics the effect of sensor faults and environmental
conditions. We study the propagation of faults into the system
and assess the ability of the control software in masking
the faults, timely detection of errors and raising alerts, and
mitigating safety hazards.
To reduce the test space and increase the probability of
generation of unsafe scenarios, we present a strategic software
fault injection approach where the triggers for injecting the
faults are driven by the high-level hazard analysis of the
system. Specifically, we use the Systems-Theoretic Process
Analysis (STPA) [10] hazard analysis technique to identify
the potential unsafe scenarios in an AV with ACC and LKAS
mechanisms. The identified unsafe scenarios are then translated
into fault injection campaigns where the potentially unsafe
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system contexts (defined by the unique combinations of state
variables) are used as conditions under which the faults are
injected into the control software. We compare the perfor-
mance of the STPA guided fault injection approach in covering
hazardous scenarios to a random fault injection approach.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• STPA based hazard analysis technique is applied to
identify the unsafe control actions that may cause safety
hazards in ACC and LKAS of AVs.
• An open-source testbed for safety validation of AVs is
developed by integrating the openpilot PC simulator with
a computer vision based lane marker detection module
and a software fault injection framework that mimics the
effect of faults on the RADAR and car sensors as well
as real-world environmental conditions impacting camera
input, such as rain, fog, snow, occlusion, and blur.
• A strategic software fault injection framework based on
STPA is developed where the locations and triggers for
injecting the faults are driven by the unsafe control actions
and critical system context identified during the hazard
analysis process. We show that using this technique, the
probability of generation of unsafe scenarios and hazard
coverage is increased and, thus, the fault injection space
is reduced.
• Resilience of the open-source self-driving agent openpilot
against faults in the RADAR, camera, and car sensors is
evaluated by characterizing the propagation of the faults
into the system and assessing the ability of the control and
safety mechanisms in masking and detection of unsafe
scenarios and timely alert on possible safety hazards.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Openpilot is an open-source alpha quality driving agent
introduced by Comma.ai [11] for research purposes. It is
designed with both ACC and LKAS capabilities, and using an
additional hardware EON Dashcam DevKit [12] can control
the gas, brake, and steering on certain car models, including
Honda Civic 2016-2018, Acura ILX 2016, and Toyota RAV4
2016. The left part of Fig. 1 shows the overall system architec-
ture of an AV with ACC and LKAS features. The interactions
among the human driver, the autonomous controller, and the
controlled process (vehicle) are depicted. The functional con-
trol diagram of the autonomous controller is further expanded
in the right part of Fig. 1. In this figure, the interactions of the
human driver with the autonomous controller and the vehicle
(when autonomous control is offline) are shown with dashed
lines with arrows. These interactions will not be studied in
this work, as our main focus is to evaluate the resilience
of the autonomous controller to the faults and environmental
conditions affecting the sensor data.
Control Mechanisms: Openpilot uses vehicle’s radar to
estimate the lead vehicle’s position and speed to maintain a
safe distance with it, while driving at desired cruise speed. For
the lane keeping assistance, it uses phone camera to capture the
sequences of images of the road and detect the lane markers.
The control software consists of several threads, including
controls thread, radar thread, vision thread, and sensor thread.
Controls thread is the main control loop (running at 100Hz)
that communicates with the lower level car control mecha-
nisms. Radar thread parses the messages from the car radar and
derives the positions and velocities of up to two lead vehicles.
The ACC algorithm uses this information to calculate the target
acceleration or deceleration. It also uses the information on the
current speed of the host vehicle from the sensor thread. In
the recent versions of openpilot, the relative distance of the
lead vehicle is also captured based on the camera data. The
autonomous controller uses the relative distance information
coming from both the radar and vision modules, but the ACC
still mainly relies on the radar data for estimating relative
distance. Vision thread runs a neural network based algorithm
to detect the road lane markers and outputs the best estimate
of the path. LKAS lateral control algorithm uses this path
information and current steer angle information (collected from
the sensor thread) to derive the required steer torque to be
applied to keep the vehicle in the center of the lane.
Safety Mechanisms: The existing safety mechanisms of
openpilot include an alert manager module responsible for
generating warning messages to alert the driver in case of
any emergency situations. The majority of these warnings are
related to the technical issues with the car, such as brake
unavailable, gas unavailable, or door open. In this work, we
mainly focus on the alerts related to the functionality of the
ACC and LKAS as well as the radar and vision modules,
e.g., CAN errors, communication errors, steer saturation errors.
Openpilot software has also been recently equipped with
a forward collision warning (FCW) system that triggers a
warning if the vehicle needs to decelerate quickly to avoid
a rear-end collision with the lead vehicle. In this study, we
evaluate the functionality of ACC and LKAS systems and the
performance of the FCW system in case of faulty inputs.
PC Simulator: Openpilot has a PC simulator that enables
running its control software without the actual car and radar
sensors in the loop. The simulator mimics the functionality
of the actual car and radar module, but instead of modeling
the camera functionality and including vision processing, it
uses a simplified model of an infinitely long straight lane with
the vehicle always being at the center of the lane (the actual
vision module used in openpilot [13] is not open-source). In
order to simulate more realistic road conditions, we developed
a simulated vision module and integrated it with the openpilot
PC simulator.
Vision Module: Our simulated vision module takes RGB
road images (video frames) as input and generates the positions
of the left and right lane markers on the road which is used
by the openpilot LKAS system. The lane marker detection
algorithm exploits histogram of oriented gradient (HOG) [14]
and neural networks (NN) [15] to process the pre-collected
images of the road. In our experiments, we used the video
frames from the Caltech lanes dataset [16], but any other
dataset is applicable here.
HOG was introduced in [14] for human detection in
images, but its application can be extended to other object
detection and image segmentation techniques. The feature
extraction procedure using HOG starts with a sliding detection
window which is divided into equally spaced blocks. From
each block, gradient vectors in both horizontal and vertical
directions are calculated and put in a histogram which is used
as the gradient feature. L2 normalization method is used for
feature normalization to make it invariant to the illumination
changes. A simple NN (patternnet in MATLAB) with an
Fig. 1: High-level control structure of an AV with ACC and LKAS mechanisms: The autonomous controller is expanded to
illustrate the control algorithm responsibilities and process model (state variables) used in the openpilot software. The targeted
locations for fault injection are highlighted.
input layer, one hidden layer with 10 nodes (MATLAB default)
and an output layer was trained using these features. The NN
classifies the detection windows from an input image into two
classes, (i) with lane marker, and (ii) without lane marker.
The output from the HOG-NN are the candidate image blocks
that are part of the lane markers. Then to extract the lane
markers from each block, Sobel edge detector with horizontal
derivative (to detect vertical edges) [17] is used, which gives
a binary image with white pixels representing the edges of
the lane markers. To separate the left and right lane markers,
a density-based clustering algorithm DBSCAN [18] is used.
Assuming the vertical line drawn through the middle of the
image as the current path of the vehicle, the immediate left
and right lines from the middle line can be considered as the
left and right lane markers. The detected lane markers in a
sequence of frames constitute the path model that is used by
the openpilot LKAS system. Fig. 2 shows a sample output
from the lane marker detection algorithm.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: A sample output from the lane marker detection
algorithm, (a) input video frame, (b) detected left (red) and
right (blue) lane markers.
Fig. 3 shows an overview of the extended openpilot
simulator with the simulated vision module and fault injec-
tion framework. The Lane Detector block implements the
lane marker detection algorithm described above. The Image
Library contains the dataset of images used for simulation
experiments. The Image Translation block is used to mimic
the effects of changing steering angle on the view of camera
and horizontally translates the input images based on the lateral
movement of the simulated vehicle.
Fig. 3: Extended openpilot PC simulator [19] with our sim-
ulated vision module (lane marker detection algorithm) and
fault injection framework.
III. METHODOLOGY
This section describes the steps taken for system hazard
analysis using STPA and design of an STPA guided fault
injection framework for safety validation.
A. System-theoretic Hazard Analysis
We used STPA to identify the potential safety hazards of
the ACC and LKAS enabled AVs and the causal factors leading
to such hazards. The main task of the ACC is to maintain a safe
distance with the lead vehicle while moving at cruise speed,
and the LKAS keeps the vehicle inside the lanes. Based on
the functionality of ACC and LKAS, we first classify the AV
accidents into three types:
• A1: rear-end collision with the lead vehicle,
• A2: causing traffic congestion or collision with the trail-
ing vehicle, and
• A3: side collision with other vehicles or road-side objects.
Three types of system hazards or set of system states could
result in those accidents:
• H1: AV violates maintaining safety distance with the lead
vehicle that may result in A1.
• H2: AV decelerates to a full stop although there is no
lead vehicle which may lead to A2.
• H3: AV goes out of lane which may lead to A3.
Next step is to model the overall hierarchical safety con-
trol structure of the openpilot system, as shown in Fig. 1.
We identified unsafe control actions that lead to hazardous
scenarios and potential causal factors for the unsafe actions
by examining inputs and outputs across different loops of
the control structure. Outputs of the ACC and LKAS are
gas/brake and steer-torque, respectively. Following the STPA
categories, the potential unsafe control actions can be classified
as, ”Acceleration”, ”Deceleration”, ”Steer” commands (using
gas/brake/steer-torque): (i) required but not provided, (ii) not
required but provided, (iii) provided but with incorrect timing,
and (iv) provided for a wrong duration [10]. For example,
Fig. 4 shows the simulation of a scenario where faulty radar
data caused unsafe control actions - brake (”Deceleration”)
provided for short period (Fig. 4a) and gas (”Acceleration”)
provided at a wrong time (Fig. 4b), which further led the host
vehicle collide with the lead vehicle (A1/H1) (Fig. 4c).
B. STPA Guided Fault Injection
Because of the complexity of the AVs control software, the
test space for fault injection testing is often huge. For example,
openpilot software used in this work consists of 146 python
files with over 22,000 lines of code. Thus, it might take a long
time for a random fault injection approach to generate hazard
scenarios of interest. To address this challenge, we adapt a
strategic fault injection approach where the target locations
and triggers (or conditions) for injecting the faults are driven
by the hazard analysis of the system.
Our fault injection framework evaluates the resilience of
AV controller by simulating the unsafe scenarios (unsafe
control actions and potential causal factors) identified by STPA
using software-implemented fault injection. In this paper, we
mainly focus on the causal factors related to the faulty inputs
which might directly affect AV controller perception function-
ality. This is motivated by a recent study [9] of the field data
on AVs from the California Department of Motor Vehicles that
found the faults in the perception systems are responsible for
the majority of disengagements per mile across manufacturers
(44% of reported disengagements). As shown in Fig. 1, three
main sources of the inputs to the openpilot controller are radar,
camera, and car sensors. The controller uses the information
provided by these sensors to calculate the required gas/brake
and steer torque. So, our target modules for injecting faults are
(i) Vision module, (ii) RADAR module, and (iii) Car sensors.
In the case of vision module, faults are injected to both input
images and output (position of the lane markers). For radar
and car sensors, only the outputs produced (sent to controller)
by these modules are subject to fault injection.
Using STPA the context or set of system states under
which the unsafe control actions occur can be identified from
the combinations of the state variables used to describe the
process model in the system control structure. We use the
identified context for unsafe control actions as the triggers
for fault injection. Fig. 1 shows that the state variables of
TABLE I: Example STPA context table for Accelerate or
Decelerate control actions
Control
Actions
Context Hazardous Control?
Headway Time (HWT1)
Relative
Speed
(RS2)
Command
Not
Provided
Command
Provided
Accelerate
HWT ≤ safeHWT 3 RS ≤ 0 No No
RS > 0 No Yes-H1
HWT > safeHWT
RS ≤ 0 Yes-H2 No
RS > 0 No Yes-H1
Decelerate
HWT ≤ safeHWT RS ≤ 0 No No
RS > 0 Yes-H1 No
HWT > safeHWT
RS ≤ 0 No Yes-H2
RS > 0 Yes-H1 No
the autonomous controller process model are relative distance
and speed, current speed of the host vehicle, steer angle, and
path model. For deducing the system context we use a subset
of these variables, including relative distance, relative speed,
and current speed. Relative speed is represented by HVspeed−
LVspeed in which HVspeed and LVspeed represent the speed of
the host vehicle and lead vehicle respectively. Relative distance
and host vehicle’s speed can be combined into headway time
(RelativeDistance/CurrentSpeed). Headway time (HWT)
is the time gap between the host vehicle and lead vehicle. Table
I shows an example context table for the ”Accelerate” and
”Decelerate” control actions. The ”Context” column in each
row of the table represents the condition (using combinations
of HWT and relative speed variables) that is used as the trigger
for injecting the faults. For example, to generate an unsafe
”Accelerate” command which might lead to hazard H1 (row
2), faults are injected to the input images when the relative
speed (RS) of the vehicle is ”high” and the HWT is ”less than
a safe distance (safeHWT)”.
C. Fault Injection Framework
As discussed before, we simulate the effect of faults and
environmental conditions by injecting faults into the inputs and
outputs of the vision module, the RADAR, and car sensor. To
do this, we have generated a library of faulty images based
on the effects described in Table II. During simulation, the
vision module reads the images with different faults based on
the specified fault model. For the RADAR, car sensors, vision
outputs, faults are injected using a compile-time fault injection
approach similar to [20]. First, a fault library is manually
compiled based on the fault models (defining the locations
and values for injection) and the STPA context table (defining
the injection triggers). Then the fault injection campaigns are
automatically generated by creating faulty codes to be added
to the target locations within the software.
On each run of the experiments, the injector adds the
faulty codes to the specified location and then executes the
openpilot simulator. The time of triggering the fault, the
simulation results, and the alerts generated from the openpilot
are logged for further analysis. The system outputs, including
gas/brake (ACC) and steering torque (LKAS) values were
recorded for each experiment and compared with the outputs
generated from the simulations without faults (ground truth).
1HWT = RelativeDistance/CurrentSpeed
2RS = CurrentSpeed− LeadV ehicleSpeed
3safeHWT ≈ 2.0s ∼ 3.0s
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4: Example of unsafe control actions (a) Brake provided, but for a short period, (b) Gas provided, but at a wrong time,
leading to a hazard, (c) Collision with the lead vehicle (relative distance becomes zero).
Any deviation from the ground truth was considered as the
fault being manifested.
Separate checkers are placed within the code to detect and
identify the occurrence of the three hazards (H1, H2, H3).
The H1 hazard (violation of safety distance) is checked based
on the relative distance with respect to the lead vehicle. Speed
and relative distance are used to check whether the H2 (sudden
stop) hazard has happened or not. Deviation from the center
path is recorded to check the out of lane hazard (H3). If any of
these three hazards occur, the time of hazard is also recorded.
The fault models and the parameters used for injecting
faults into different modules are described next.
1) Vision Module: In the vision module, faults are injected
into the input frames as well as the outputs, including the left
and right lane positions and the predicted path of the vehicle.
By injecting faults to input images, we measure the resilience
of the ML lane detection algorithm. By injecting faults to the
outputs we evaluate the response of the LKAS system if the
vision module produces erroneous outputs. To implement these
faults, random values are added/subtracted to/from the path
model variables. It is also possible that the camera becomes
unavailable or the communication between vision data and
control thread gets disconnected. To simulate these faults, the
vision data is made unavailable after a certain time (after the
trigger) of the simulation.
Faults injected to the input images of the vision module
simulate real-world environmental conditions such as rain, fog,
snow, and occlusion created by mud/snow on camera. We
also use other transformations like contrast change, brightness
change, and adding blur to the images to evaluate the resilience
of LKAS. More details on adding these effects to the input
images are described below:
Rain: To add the effect of rain, rain streaks from the
database [21] are used. Rain streaks are added in random
positions. For varying the density of the streaks, a ’thickness’
parameter is used. The value of ’thickness’ varies from 0 to 10,
0 means no rain and 10 indicates maximum density (10,000
streaks per image). The angle of the streaks can also be varied.
To adjust with the background, the contrast of the rain streak
is reduced and motion blur is added to the streaks. Besides
adding the streaks, rain has also other effects (e.g., cloudy,
gloomy) on the environment. To add those effects, we apply
Gaussian blur and contrast reduction (varies with thickness)
to the background of image. The values for the number of
streaks, standard deviation (σ) of Gaussian blur, and contrast
gain (α) for the background are set empirically.
Fog: For creating the foggy effect, a uniformly distributed
random noise is added to the images. Also a Gaussian blur is
applied to the noise to add the blurriness effect. Density of the
added noise varies with ’thickness’ parameter. To create the
haziness, contrast of the background image is varied.
Snow: Small blocks (size 2x2) of white pixels are added
to the random locations of the image to simulate the effect
of falling snow. Similar to rain and fog, number of snow
varies with ’thickness’. Gaussian and motion blur are applied
to the white blocks. Snow-fall also creates the haziness like the
fog. So, the procedure of adding fog (described previously) is
applied on the background images first, and then falling snows
are added on top.
Occlusion: In real environment, there are many factors that
can cause occlusion. In this work, we consider the occlusions
created by mud/snow stuck on the camera. To create the
effects of occlusions, circular blobs (dark) are added in random
locations of the image. Number of the blobs can be varied and
the radius of the blob is randomly chosen from the range [5, 50]
pixels. To make the blobs blurry, Gaussian blur is applied.
Other Effects: Besides the faults described above, we also
apply some other transformations from [6] to the input images.
These are changes in contrast, brightness, and blur (averaging,
Gaussian, median).
Table II summarizes the parameters used to inject the
mentioned effects to the input images. The last column shows
the faulty images along with the lanes detected by the lane
marker detection algorithm.
2) RADAR Module: Radar data provides the relative dis-
tance and velocity of the lead vehicle that is used by ACC to
maintain the safe distance from the lead vehicle. In real-world
environments, different types of faults can affect the radar
performance. Petit and Shladover [7] discussed four types of
cyber attacks that can reduce the radar accuracy - chaff, smart
material, jamming, and signal repeater. Similar effects can hap-
pen accidentally in real-world environments, causing the radar
module to generate erroneous results. For example, effects
similar to chaff can be found in rainy or snowy environments.
We simulate this effect by adding/subtracting random values
to/from the radar module output. In military applications,
object with non-reflective surface has been used to make it
TABLE II: Parameters used to add environmental effects and
faults to the image shown in Fig. 2a
Fault Parameters Results
Rain
• Contrast (streak): α = 0.1 ∼ 0.2
• Contrast (environment): α = 0.65 ∼ 0.75
• Motion Blur (streak): l = 2 pixels, θ = 45
degrees
• Gaussian Blur (environment): σ = 0.5∼ 1.5
Fog
• Gaussian Blur (droplets): σ = 5 ∼ 7
• Contrast (environment): α = 0.4 ∼ 0.9
Snow
• Gaussian Blur (snow): σ = 0.5 ∼ 1.5
• Motion Blur (snow): l = 5 pixels, θ = 75
degrees
• Gaussian Blur (Haze): σ = 5 ∼ 7
• Contrast (environment): α = 0.4 ∼ 0.9
Occlusion
• Blobs: Radius = 5 ∼ 50 pixels (Random)
• Gaussian Blur (blobs): σ = 7.0
Contrast
• Gain, α = 1.2 ∼ 3.0
Brightness
• Bias, α = 10 ∼ 100
Blur
• Averaging: Kernel Size = 3X3, 4X4, 5X5,
6X6
• Gaussian: Kernel Size = 3X3, 5X5, 7X7
• Median: Aperture Linear Size = 3, 5
invisible to the radar detectors. In the vehicle environments
similar phenomenon (invisible vehicle) can happen because
of interference among radar signals. Jamming can also occur
in the scenarios with high vehicle density, where interference
among the radar signals from different vehicles can create the
jamming in radar module. This may cause degradation of radar
performance and even turning off the radar. We simulate this
effect by making the radar data unavailable to the controller.
The fourth attack mentioned in [7] is a signal repeater which
is mainly used to create a ghost object in front of the radar. In
real world, rain, snow, dust or dense fog can cause a similar
effect [22], i.e., the radar module can detect a ghost vehicle
in these kinds of scenarios although there is no actual lead
vehicle or other objects on the road.
3) Car Sensors: Besides the information from the environ-
ment, the AV controller also requires the information of the
current status of the vehicle itself. For example, ACC needs the
information of current speed of the host vehicle to calculate
the target acceleration/deceleration. Or the LKAS needs the
current steer angle to learn about the current direction of the
vehicle. The AV controller gets this data from the car sensors
via CAN messages. In addition to the current speed and steer
angle, car sensors provide information about cruise settings,
gas/brake pedal status, and internal error flags generated by
the car. We only focus on the faults that affect the current
speed and steer angle values. These values can be erroneous
because of any malfunction in the sensors. We use an additive
fault model where random values (positive and negative) are
added to the actual speed and steer angle values before sending
to the control thread. The offset value added to the actual speed
is chosen in such a way that the value of current speed varies
between 0mph to twice the desired cruise speed. The steer
angle offset value is set empirically between -45°∼ +45°.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
The fault injection experiments were conducted on an x86-
64 PC with 16GB RAM running Linux Ubuntu 16.04 LTS.
The machine contained an Intel Core i7 CPU @ 3.60GHz.
The version v0.4.2 of openpilot PC simulator [8] was used.
The PC simulator takes around 35 seconds to run 30 seconds
of simulated driving. We slowed down the PC simulator to
sync it with our simulated vision module which processes the
input images at 20 frames per second. On average it took
approximately 4.5 minutes to run each experiment.
We consider different driving scenarios involving a host
vehicle with an initial constant speed of 60mph following a
lead vehicle with varying acceleration and deceleration behav-
iors. Specifically, the following five scenarios were simulated
in our experiments:
1) Lead vehicle is moving with constant speed (40mph).
2) Lead vehicle is moving with constant low speed (25mph).
3) Lead vehicle accelerates and then slows down.
4) Lead vehicle slows down and then accelerates.
5) Lead vehicle slows down to a full stop.
In total, 1128 fault injection experiments were conducted
for each scenario, leading to a total number of 5640 experi-
ments. The resilience of the target system was evaluated using
the following metrics:
• Activated Faults: If the trigger condition is fulfilled,
the fault gets activated and starts affecting the system
operation by actually generating erroneous input data.
• Manifested Faults: If the outputs of the system (e.g.,
brake, gas, torque) deviate from the expected outputs
(ground truth), then the activated fault is considered to be
manifested. The manifested faults result in either Silent
Data Corruption (SDC) or Hazards.
• Hazard Coverage (C): We measure the coverage of
safety-critical faults by the fault injection experiments us-
ing hazard coverage, defined as the conditional probability
that given activation of a fault in the system, it leads to
an unsafe state or hazardous condition.
• Reaction Time: Reaction time is the maximum time the
driver has for responding to an alert and taking actions
and is an important metric for measuring the performance
of collision warning systems [23]. Here the reaction time
is defined as the time between raise of an alert by the AV
controller and the occurrence of a hazard.
We also compared the performance of the STPA guided
fault injection vs. random fault injection in terms of fault acti-
vation rate and hazard coverage. In the random fault injection,
the same number of faults are injected to the same target
variables within the control software, but instead of using the
STPA contexts as trigger, a random time during simulation is
selected as the trigger for injection. Each experiment consisted
of injecting the erroneous values to the target variables when
the specific trigger is met and continuing the injection for as
long as the trigger is active (in case of guided injection) or for
the rest of simulation (in case of random injection).
B. Outcome Analysis
In 3678 out of 5640 (65.2%) guided injections, faults got
activated and actually caused erroneous system inputs. Fault
manifestation rate was 99.4% (3656) with respect to activated
faults. Only in around 35.8% of the activated faults, hazards
occurred. The controller generated alerts in 69.5% of the
hazardous scenarios (914 out of 1316), i.e., a large portion
(30.5%) of hazards remained unnoticed. Table III summarizes
the overall fault injection results. Columns 2-6 contain the
separate results for different driving scenarios and column 7
shows the combined results. The remaining columns show
the results of random injection experiments. Total number
of experiments done for the random injection was the same
as the guided technique, however almost all the faults got
activated. Hazard coverage for the guided and random fault
injection techniques were 35.78% (1316/3678) vs. 28.97%
(1634/5640), respectively. This implies that using context-
based triggers results in relatively better hazard coverage than
random-time triggers. However, this hypothesis needs to be
further examined with larger number of experiments. Table IV
shows the comparative hazard coverage achieved by guided vs.
random fault injection techniques under different fault models.
1) Hazard Analysis: As mentioned before, three possible
hazards were taken into consideration: violation of safety dis-
tance (H1), unnecessary deceleration (H2), and vehicle going
out of the lanes (H3). The results show that in the majority
of cases, a single hazard happened (H1/H2/H3). But in some
cases, both H1 and H3 happened in the same experiment.
The distribution of the hazards for different fault types are
illustrated in Fig. 5. H1 and H2 hazards are mainly related
to ACC functionality. Thus, the majority of these hazards are
caused by the faults injected to the radar module. H3 hazards
are caused by the faults in vision module and car (steer)
sensors. In a significant number of cases, H1 and H3 occurred
together. In those cases, first H3 occurred due to faults in the
vision module, then collision with the lead vehicle occurred
while the vehicle tried to get inside the lane.
2) Time Analysis: We also analyzed the propagation time
of the faults into the system. The manifestation time (tm) of
the faults is calculated during post processing of logs, but the
hazard (th) and alert (ta) times are recorded at runtime. All
the times are measured with respect to the fault injection time,
i.e., after the faults are triggered. The average fault propagation
times have been shown in Fig. 6. The time between the first
alert and the hazard occurrence (tr = th − ta) is calculated
as tr, representing the maximum time a human driver will
have to take control of the vehicle after seeing an alert. The
time a driver actually takes to react to an alert is defined as
driver reaction time (tR). A safe AV controller should have a
tr which is greater than the reaction time tR. The reaction time
varies from driver to driver. In [23], it is stated that average
Fig. 5: Distribution of different fault types across the three
hazard scenarios.
Fig. 6: Average fault propagation times for different scenarios.
reaction time of the human drivers is around 1.8s if visual
warnings are used. Fig. 6 shows that in openpilot, average time
difference between alerts and hazards varies between 2.71s and
6.08s which is greater than this average reaction time. So, in
general human drivers get enough time to react to alerts. But
we found that in almost 30.5% of the hazardous scenarios, no
alerts were generated. This means that the human driver needs
to be cautious all the time and should not completely rely on
the AV to generate alerts in all the scenarios.
3) Performance Under Different Faults: Table IV shows
the performance of the openpilot for different types of faults in-
jected to the inputs of ACC and LKAS systems. As mentioned
in section III-C, four different fault models were considered
for the radar module. In total, 714 faults got activated and in
almost 28.9% cases, the faults caused hazards. We found that
the AV controller responds better in case of faults injected to
the car sensors, as only 21.3% of cases lead to hazards.
For the vision module, we injected faults to both input
images and output path model. Hazards occurred in cases of
images with rain, snow, occlusion, and change of contrast
effects. Other effects such as fog, brightness, and blur did not
cause any hazards. Almost all the faults injected to the path
model (detected left and right lane positions by the vision
module) led to hazardous events (99.8%). These erroneous
values caused the vehicle go out of the lane and in some cases,
also collide with the lead vehicle (H1 and H3 together). Faults
were also injected to the relative distance values generated
from the vision module. But, no hazards happened in these
cases because ACC mainly depends on the radar data for
perceiving the lead vehicle’s status. Injecting faults to both
radar and vision modules at the same time caused H1 hazards
but that is mainly due to the faults in radar data, indicating that
the vision data does not have much effect on ACC outputs.
TABLE III: Summary of fault injection results for the five driving scenarios (The percentage of activated faults is with respect
to the number of injected faults. The other percentages are with respect to the number of activated faults).
No. / Scenarios STPA Guided RandomS1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Total S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Total
Injected Faults 1128 1128 1128 1128 1128 5640 1128 1128 1128 1128 1128 5640
Activated Faults 613(54.3%)
797
(70.7%)
867
(76.9%)
798
(70.7%)
603
(53.5%)
3678
(65.2%)
1128
(100.0%)
1128
(100.0%)
1128
(100.0%)
1128
(100.0%)
1128
(100.0%)
5640
(100.0%)
Manifested Faults 610(99.5%)
795
(99.7%)
858
(99.0%)
796
(99.7%)
597
(99.0%)
3656
(99.4%)
1111
(98.5%)
1070
(94.9%)
1045
(92.6%)
1021
(90.5%)
1028
(91.1%)
5275
(93.5%)
Hazards 215(35.1%)
291
(36.5%)
274
(31.6%)
264
(33.1%)
272
(45.1%)
1316
(35.8%)
314
(27.8%)
318
(28.2%)
315
(27.9%)
256
(22.7%)
431
(38.2%)
1634
(29.0%)
Alerts 236(38.5%)
333
(41.8%)
399
(46.0%)
336
(42.1%)
266
(44.1%)
1570
(42.7%)
399
(35.4%)
401
(35.5%)
400
(35.5%)
404
(35.8%)
157
(13.9%)
1761
(31.2%)
Hazards with no Alerts 79(12.9%)
92
(11.5%)
64
(7.4%)
73
(9.1%)
94
(15.6%)
402
(10.9%)
147
(13.0%)
166
(14.7%)
145
(12.9%)
96
(8.5%)
323
(28.6%)
877
(15.5%)
Alerts with no Hazards 100(16.3%)
134
(16.8%)
189
(21.8%)
145
(18.2%)
88
(14.6%)
656
(17.8%)
232
(20.6%)
249
(22.1%)
230
(20.4%)
244
(21.6%)
49
(4.3%)
1004
(17.8%)
TABLE IV: Fault Activation rate and Hazard Coverage for
guided vs. random fault injection across different fault types.
STPA Guided Random
Ta
rg
et
M
od
ul
e
Fault Type
Faults
Activated
# (%)
Hazard
Coverage
# (%)
Faults
Activated
# (%)
Hazard
Coverage
# (%)
R
A
D
A
R
Chaff 432 (90.0) 154 (35.6) 480 (100.0) 260 (54.2)
Invisible Vehicle 108 (90.0) 9 (8.3) 120 (100.0) 39 (32.5)
Ghost Vehicle 155 (25.0) 34 (21.9) 620 (100.0) 88 (14.2)
Radar Jamming 19 (95.0) 9 (47.4) 20 (100.0) 4 (20.0)
C
ar
Se
ns
or
s
Speed Sensor 138 (57.5) 11 (8.0) 240 (100.0) 15 (6.2)
Steer Sensor 190 (95.0) 59 (31.1) 200 (100.0) 77 (38.5)
V
is
io
n
In
pu
ts
Rain 140 (70.0) 130 (92.9) 200 (100.0) 135 (67.5)
Fog 139 (69.5) 0 (0.0) 200 (100.0) 1 (0.5)
Snow 140 (70.0) 57 (40.7) 200 (100.0) 56 (28.0)
Occlusion 140 (70.0) 72 (51.4) 200 (100.0) 74 (37.0)
Contrast 139 (69.5) 78 (56.1) 200 (100.0) 87 (43.5)
Brightness 140 (70.0) 0 (0.0) 200 (100.0) 1 (0.5)
Blur 126 (70.0) 0 (0.0) 180 (100.0) 1 (0.6)
V
is
io
n
O
ut
pu
ts
Camera
Unavailable 18 (90.0) 12 (66.7) 20 (100.0) 6 (30.0)
Path Model 540 (90.0) 539 (99.8) 600 (100.0) 470 (78.3)
Relative Distance 557 (56.8) 0 (0.0) 980 (100.0) 0 (0.0)
R
ad
ar
V
is
io
n
Relative Distance 557 (56.8) 152 (27.3) 980 (100.0) 320 (32.7)
C. Observations
This section summarizes the findings derived from the fault
injection experiments in the form of four main observations.
Observation 1: Openpilot, the open source driving agent
studied in this work, cannot tolerate safety-critical faults.
• Table III shows that the alert generation rate with respect
to the activated faults is 42.7%. This means that in a
large number of cases (∼57.3%), faults to the inputs
degraded the performance of the AV controller, but still
went unnoticed.
• Although the number of alerts (1570) is larger than the
number of hazards (1316), in 10.9% of cases (with respect
to total activated faults) hazards happened but no alerts
showed up to warn the driver (Table III).
• In some cases, both H1 and H3 hazards occurred at the
same time (Fig. 5). One possible reason was that the
vehicle went out of lane because of the faults injected
to vision module, then AV controller tried to get it back
inside the lane and the vehicle collided with the lead
vehicle. Currently, openpilot is not equipped with ’lane-
change’ assist systems, so it is not ready to perfectly
handle these kinds of situations.
• FCW showed up in the following driving scenarios:
◦ Scene2: lead is moving with low speed (25mph).
◦ Scene4: lead slows down first and then accelerates.
◦ Scene5: lead slows down to a full stop.
In these cases, average speed of the lead vehicle is
low, i.e., relative speed (difference between HV and LV
speeds) was high, and, thus, the relative distance was
decreasing at a higher rate. So, the FCW was triggered.
In the other two scenarios, the average speed of the lead
vehicle was higher and no FCW alerts showed up.
Observation 2: The recovery measures in openpilot are
insufficient for the faults to the input modules.
• Openpilot uses both radar and camera data to calculate
relative distance between the lead and host vehicles. But,
ACC mainly depends on the radar data, and relative
distance coming from vision data only helps to make it
more accurate. Table IV shows that vision data could not
help to avoid collision in case of faulty radar data. When
we only injected faults to the relative distance coming
from the vision outputs, no hazards happened as the radar
data was not perturbed. Injecting faults to both radar and
vision data could lead to hazardous scenarios, but they
were mainly caused by faulty radar data. So, the technique
used by openpilot for fusion of the radar and vision data
is not sufficient for reducing the risk of collision in case
of faulty radar data.
• Openpilot generates visual and auditory alerts if it detects
any problems. Overall only four types of alerts showed up
during our experiments, (i) Steer Saturated: if the required
steer torque is larger than a threshold, (ii) FCW: if the
controller detects that the lead vehicle is getting too close
and there is a possibility of collision, (iii) CAN Error:
if the RADAR message becomes unavailable, and (iv)
Model Error: if the Vision message is unavailable. The
warning messages were shown to the driver to take control
and avoid unwanted circumstances. Table III shows that
in 914 out of 1316 cases, hazard occurred after the alerts
had been generated. This means that if the driver fails to
take control in time, the autonomous controller does not
have adequate safety mechanisms to avoid the hazards.
• In case of unavailability of data from Radar or Camera,
alert messages were displayed to the driver to take control
of the vehicle and autonomous control system stops
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Both (a) Brake and (b) Gas become unavailable because
of a ’radar jamming’ fault.
operating (Fig. 7) instead of taking any recovery actions
such as slowing down the vehicle. So, the driver must be
alert to take control at any time to avoid any hazardous
situations.
• The lane marker detection algorithm works fine in case
of Fog, Brightness, and Blur effects. Very few hazardous
circumstances have occurred in these cases according to
Table IV. But its performance dropped in case of Rain,
Snow, Occlusion, and Contrast changes, and thus the
system suffered from H3 hazards. This means that the
controller did not take sufficient preventive or corrective
actions to stop the vehicle from going out of the lane.
Although in these cases the openpilot generated alerts,
those alerts were mainly related to steering saturation.
Observation 3: The time interval between generation of
first alert and the occurrence of a hazard is greater than
average reaction time of the drivers.
• Fig. 6 shows that the average time interval between raising
an alert and the occurrence of a hazard is always greater
than 1.8s (the average reaction time of the drivers). So,
in all those cases, the human driver should have enough
time to take control of the vehicle.
Observation 4: Context-based fault injection shows rela-
tively better manifestation rate and hazard coverage than
the random time based injection.
• Table III shows that in case of STPA guided fault in-
jection, the activation rate is lower than random fault
injection. Because in guided injection, the trigger condi-
tions are derived based on the context (Table I) which
may not always happen depending on the simulated
driving scenario. But in random injection, a random time
during simulation is chosen as the trigger which will
always result in a fault injection (100% activation rate),
i.e., random injection technique practically injects larger
number of faults using the same number of experiments.
• Random triggers resulted in a much higher number of
injections (5640 vs. 3678) and slightly larger number of
hazards (1634 vs. 1316). However, the fault manifesta-
tion (99.4% vs. 93.5%) and hazard coverage (35.8% vs.
29.0%) (with respect to the number of activated faults)
were higher in guided fault injection. This observation
supports our hypothesis that context based triggers can
better simulate the safety-critical scenarios by activating
faults only at critical times during simulation. On the
other hand, a randomly selected injection time may not
always give the activated faults enough chance to further
propagate and cause safety-critical impacts.
From the above discussion, we can conclude that the
openpilot shows low resilience to the changes in environment
and faults affecting sensor data. The driver must always be
alert to take control and is still responsible for most of the
safety-critical functions of the vehicle and monitoring of the
environment. This is consistent with the conclusions made by
[9] that AVs need better situational awareness to be able to
preemptively avoid accidents in a timely fashion.
V. RELATED WORK
The related work on resilience assessment of AVs can be
classified into three categories: (i) Hazard and requirements
analysis, (ii) Fault injection testing, and (iii) Adversarial ML.
Hazard and requirements analysis: The international
safety standard for automobiles (ISO 26262) recommends
identifying potential safety hazards and defining safety require-
ments to implement mechanisms that can detect and mitigate
hazards. Commonly used hazard analysis techniques such as
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [24] [25] and
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [26] primarily focus on probabilistic
analysis of individual component failures in the system. Other
causal factors, e.g., complex software errors and unsafe interac-
tions among components given underlying system context, are
often not thoroughly studied in these techniques. To overcome
these limitations, STPA [10], a technique based on STAMP
(Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes), has been
proposed. STPA models the accidents as complex dynamic
processes resulting from inadequate control mechanisms that
violate safety constraints. STPA has been previously applied
to hazard analysis in AVs [27] [28]. [29] and [30] used STPA
for hazard analysis of collision avoidance systems. Asim et
al. [31] proposed a semi-autonomous method for test case
generation from manually generated STPA tables. In this work,
we use STPA to analyze the potential unsafe control actions in
LKAS and ACC modules of an AV, and use the system context
for unsafe control actions to identify the critical triggers for
injecting faults into the control software.
Safety validation by software fault injection: The ISO
26262 standard also emphasizes the importance of fault-
injection testing [32] to evaluate the performance of safety
mechanisms in automotive systems. Software fault injection
and fuzz testing have been previously used for the resilience
and robustness testing of automotive software and AVs [33]
[34] [35]. [33] presented preliminary results on a fault injector
for evaluating the end-to-end resilience of AVs to faults in
the sensor inputs, neural networks, and hardware software
components of an AV simulator. In [35], fuzz testing was used
to find bugs in 17 different autonomous systems by injecting
exceptional values from a fault dictionary into the interface
messages at random periods during system run-time. In our
approach the locations and trigger conditions for injections are
driven by the STPA hazard analysis and the overall resilience
of system is assessed by measuring the manifestation of unsafe
scenarios, hazard coverage, and fault propagation times.
Adversarial Machine Learning: Another active area of
research focuses on testing ML algorithms used for computer
vision, perception, and planning in AVs [4], [5] [6]. The closest
work in this category to us is DeepTest [6] that automatically
tests the DNN-driven steering angle prediction algorithms
(LKAS feature) in AVs by injecting single (e.g. contrast,
brightness, blur etc.) or composite (e.g. rain and fog) faults
into the input images. The end-to-end resilience assessment of
AV, the impact of faults on the performance of ACC system,
and their propagation into causing hazards were not studied
by DeepTest. In this paper, we simulated the real-world effects
of environmental conditions (e.g. rain, snow, fog) as well as
sensor faults on the performance of both ACC and LKAS
systems. We not only tested the impact of faulty images on
the performance of vision algorithms, but also characterized
the propagation of the faults in the control software of the
driving agent and the possibility of causing hazards.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a fault injection framework for evaluating the
resilience of an open-source AV software (openpilot) in the
face of environmental conditions and faults affecting car sen-
sors. We presented a strategic fault injection approach where
the targets and triggers for injecting the faults are derived from
the unsafe control actions and critical system context identified
during the hazard analysis of the system. The experimental
results indicate that: i) our strategic fault injection approach
provides a better coverage of hazard scenarios compared to
random fault injection, and ii) although openpilot is equipped
with safety mechanisms to alert the driver, faulty sensor data
might still cause it to issue unsafe control actions, leading
to safety hazards. Also, a non-negligible percentage of those
hazards might go undetected by the controller. These results
indicate the need for developing more effective situational
awareness and safety mechanisms in openpilot controller.
Further evaluation of the proposed fault injection approach
with a wider set of scenarios and using other AV controllers
and simulators is the subject of future work.
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